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Uniform Copyright Protections for 
Computer Software in the EEC 
INTRODUCTION 
. Legal protections for computer programs against unauthorized 
reproduction vary significantly among individual member states 
of the European Economic Community (EEC).1 Differences in 
the availability and scope of protection may restrain or otherwise 
distort the free movement of goods and services within the Com-
munity and thereby discourage software innovation and devel-
opment.2 The Commission of the European Communities3 (Com-
mission) has expressly recognized the fundamental importance 
of the computer industry to the EEC's economic development.4 
Moreover, the Commission has expressed concern as to the com-
petitiveness of European firms in the world software market.5 
Harmonization of legal protections would eliminate distortions 
to the internal market, foster investment and development, and 
enable European producers to better compete with those of the 
United States and other industrialized nations.6 
1 See, e.g., Comment, Copyright Protection of Software in the EEC: The Competing Policies 
Underlying Community and National Law and the Case for Harmonization, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
633, 645-57 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Software Protection in the EEC]. The terms 
"program," "computer program," and "software" are used interchangeably throughout 
this Comment. 
2 See id. at 657-69. For a thorough examination of copyright protections within the 
European Economic Community (EEC), see generally S. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COpy-
RIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS, 466-79 (1983). 
3 T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 8 (2d ed. 1988). The 
Commission of the European Communities (Commission) is comprised of seventeen 
representatives appointed by unanimous agreement among the member states. [d. The 
Commissioners, acting independently of their national governments, propose legislation, 
coordinate Community policy, and oversee enforcement of Community treaties. [d. 
4 Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
COM(88) 816 final, 31 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 91) 4, 13 (1989) [hereinafter Proposed 
Directive]; see also infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
S See Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues 
Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88) 172 final, 171-75 (1988) [hereinafter Green 
Paper]. 
6 See infra notes 88-90, 120-31 and accompanying text. In its White Paper on com-
pleting the internal market (White Paper), the Commission addressed the need for the 
harmonization of protective measures for software within the Community and announced 
that it would submit a proposal for a directive. See Completing the Internal Market, White 
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The Commission recently submitted to the Council of the Eu-
ropean Communities (Council)1 a proposal for a directive estab-
lishing a Community framework for the legal protection of com-
puter software.8 This proposed directive would protect computer 
programs as literary works by granting software creators exclusive 
rights under copyright.9 The proposed directive further defines 
the conditions and term of this protection, the person(s) in whom 
the right arises, and the acts requiring authorization of this right 
holder.lo By providing uniform legal protections within the EEC, 
the Commission hopes to eliminate market distortions and create 
an environment that is conducive to investment and innovation. I I 
This Comment considers the Commission's proposal for the 
legal protection of computer programs. 12 Part I examines the 
present state of legal protections in individual member statesl3 
Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310 final, at 37 [here-
inafter White Paper]. 
7 T. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 13-14. The Council of the European Communities 
(Council) is comprised of government ministers from each of the twelve member states. 
Id. Enactment of Commission proposals generally requires adoption by the Council. Id. 
a See Proposed Directive, supra note 4. Directives are legislative initiatives directed to 
the member states requiring them to harmonize national laws in conformity with Com-
munity law. CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993: CHANGES IN EEC LAW 108 
(1989). Member states must then enact their own legislation pursuant to the proscriptions 
of the directive. Id. 
9 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 13-15. For a critical evaluation of the Commission's 
proposed directive, see BUSINESS SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION, WHITE PAPER ON THE PROPOSAL 
FOR A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter BSA, WHITE PAPER]; THE COMMON STATEMENT ON THE 
EC DIRECTIVE FOR THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS (Brussels, Sept. 1989) 
[hereinafter COMMON STATEMENT] (initiative sponsored by twenty-seven European and 
United States software firms and trade associations). See also infra notes 94, 96, 99, 109, 
112-15, 117, 121. The Business Software Alliance (formerly Business Software Associa-
tion) (BSA), an industry group representing six leading U.S. software publishers, was 
organized in 1988 to combat software piracy. BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, PROFILE 1 
(1990). The BSA has been active in the consultative process related to the Commission's 
proposed directive. Id. at 2. In September 1989, the BSA organized an initiative among 
twenty-seven European and U.S. software concerns regarding the proposed directive. See 
COMMON STATEMENT, supra. The BSA has also testified before the United States Trade 
Representative on issues concerning the proposed directive and its impact on U.S. software 
interests. Financial Times, Jan. 24,1990, at 6, col. 4; Telephone interview with Lori Forte, 
Director of Public Affairs of the Business Software Alliance (Jan. 26, 1989). 
10 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 13-15; see also infra text accompanying notes 
103-04. 
11 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
12 This Comment reflects developments through February 1, 1990 as reported in pub-
licly available documents. 
IS See infra notes 17-63 and accompanying text. 
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and the distortions that arise from such divergent protections. 14 
Part II outlines the proposed Council directive. 15 Finally, Part III 
concludes that harmonization under the proposed directive 
should eliminate market distortions and provide authors with 
effective legal protections without unduly restraining software 
innovation and development. 16 
I. MEMBER STATE LAW GOVERNING UNAUTHORIZED 
REPRODUCTION OF SOFTWARE 
A. Divergent Member State Protections 
The size and growth of the European software industry is of 
fundamental importance to the economic development of the 
EEC. Computer program technology plays a vital role in nearly 
every sector of the EEC's economy including such areas as med-
icine, education, manufacturing, transport, commerce, and bank-
ingY Adequate protection against unauthorized reproduction of 
programs is therefore necessary if the development of software 
technology is to continue at a pace sufficient to support EEC 
economic growth. 18 
Computer software is a particularly vulnerable target for pi-
rates who reproduce programs at a fraction of the cost of their 
original development. 19 Pervasive piracy costs European software 
developers billions of dollars annually.20 In 1988, lost revenues 
attributable to software piracy in Spain and Italy alone totalled 
over one billion dollars.21 EEC estimates indicate that for each 
legitimate copy of a computer program, five and seven forged 
14 See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 79-119 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 120-49 and accompanying text. 
17 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 5. 
18 See id. 
19 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 3. For a discussion of international software piracy, see 
generally G. HOFFMAN, CURBING INTERNATIONAL PIRACY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR A MAJOR EXPORTING COUNTRY (1989). 
20 See Tamburrini, Software Protection: The Situation in Italy,S COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 82 
(1988). 
21 BUSINESS SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION, FACT SHEET ON SOFTWARE COPYING IN SPAIN AND 
ESTIMATES OF Loss 1 (1989); BUSINESS SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION, FACT SHEET ON SOFTWARE 
COPYING IN ITALY AND ESTIMATES OF Loss 1 (1989). 
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copies are circulating in France and the United Kingdom respec-
tively, with as many as twenty-five forgeries circulating in Italy.22 
Internationally, the trend, especially among major trading part-
ners of the EEC, is towards protection of software by copyright.23 
Copyright protection of computer software exists in some form 
in nearly all member states of the Community.24 Case law in 
member states has increasingly recognized protection by copy-
right,25 and many states have proposed or adopted legislation 
confirming this trend.26 Thus, at least five member states now 
explicitly recognize the protection of computer programs by 
copyright: 27 the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany),28 
France,29 the United Kingdom,30 Spain,31 and Ireland.32 Similar 
22 Tamburrini, supra note 20, at 82. By comparison, an industry trade group, the 
Software Publishers Association, estimates that in the U.S. a single forged copy of a 
program circulates for every legitimate copy. Telephone interview with Peter Beruk, 
Litigation Manager of the Software Publishers Association (Jan. 18, 1989). 
23 New Developments, Commission Proposes Legal Protection for Computer Programs, 4 Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,036 (1989). 
24 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178. For a thorough examination of the legal protections 
available in each member state prior to this proposed directive, see Comment, Software 
Protection in the EEC, supra note 1. 
25 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178. See, e.g., Judgment of November 24, 1986, Corte 
cass., Foro Italiano, Corte casso [Foro It. I] (1987, n.5) 289, cited in Sumner, Copyright, 
Patent, and Trade Secret Protection for Computer Software in Western Europe, 8 COMPUTER L.J. 
327, 356 (1988) (Italian Supreme Court decision affirming that software is subject to 
copyright as a creative work); Judgment of March 7, 1986, Casso ass. plt~n., Bulletin des 
arrets de la Cour de cassation, chambres civiles, Cinquieme section civile [Bull. Civ. V] 5 
[hereinafter Judgment of March 7, 1986], cited in Sumner, supra, at 348 (French Supreme 
Court ruling extending copyright protections to computer programs). 
26 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178. 
27 [d. While the Commission's Green Paper does not report on the status of Irish 
copyright protections for software, the Irish delegation to the 1985 World Intellectual 
Property Convention reported that Irish copyright law does in fact extend such protec-
tions. See Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note I, at 655. 
28 Urheberrechtsgesetz, 1985 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI.I] 1137 , trans. in UNESCO 
& WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAws AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, at Germany: Item 1-1 (Supp. 
1984-86) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES]. 
29 Loi nO 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985, Relative aux droits d'auteur et aux droits des artists-
interpretes, des producteurs de phonogrammes et de videogrammes et des enterprises 
de communication audiovisuelle, Titre V, 1985 Journal Officiel de la Republique Franc;aise 
0.0.] 7495, 1985 Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 361 [hereinafter Loi n° 85-660 du 3 
juillet 1985], trans. in COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES, supra note 28, at France: Item 1-3 
(Supp. 1958). 
30 Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act, 1985, ch. 41, reprinted in COpy-
RIGHT LAWS & TREATIES, supra note 28, at United Kingdom: Item 1-2 (Supp. 1984-86). 
31 Intellectual Property Law of Nov('mber II, 1987, cited in Sumner, supra note 25, at 
362. 
32 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note I, at 655; see also supra note 27. 
1990] UNIFORM PROTECTIONS FOR SOFTWARE 487 
legislative initiatives are underway in three other member states: 
Italy,33 Denmark,34 and the Netherlands.35 In addition, both 
Belgium36 and Luxembourg37 are favoring the protection of soft-
ware by copyright. Only Greece38 and PortugaP9 have failed to 
embrace copyright protection of computer programs.40 
Judicial interpretation of copyright law and the extent of pro-
tection provided vary significantly among those member states 
that do recognize protection of software by copyright.4! Gener-
ally, member state protections diverge as to eligibility criteria,42 
scope,43 and duration.44 
1. Eligibility Criteria for Copyright Protection 
Where a member state has extended copyright protections to 
software, court decisions may limit the types of programs quali-
fying for protection.45 German courts limit protection to personal 
33 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178; see also Sumner, supra note 25, at 356-57. 
34 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178; see also Sumner, supra note 25, at 344-45. 
35 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178; Woltring, Going Dutch Between Copyright and Droit 
d'Auteur: Some Remarks on Software Protection from a Dutch Perspective, 5 COMPUTER L. & 
PRAC. 75 (1988). 
36 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 178. 
37 Id. 
sSId. 
S9 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 655. An examination of 
Portugal's Code of Copyright, published September 17, 1985, reveals that Portuguese law 
does not extend copyright protections to computer programs. See Lei n.o 45/85, de 
Setembro, Alterc;ao do Decreit~Lei n.o 63/85, de 14 de Marc;o, e do C6digo do Direito 
de Autor e dos Direitos Conexos, 1985 Boletim do Ministerio da Justic;a, Legislac;ao 5, 
trans. in COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES, supra note 28, at Portugal: Item 1 (Supp. 1984-
86). 
40 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1,655-59. In fact, copyright law 
in Greece and Portugal is marked by outright hostility to such private interests. Id. While 
some form of copyright protection for computer programs has been proposed in Portugal, 
the fact remains that in both these member states, governments hostile to private property 
interests may not vigorously enforce such laws. Id. at 655-58. 
41 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6. 
42 See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. 
45 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 187. See, e.g., Judgment of May 9, 1985, Bundesger-
ichtshof, 94 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 276 [here-
inafter Inkasso-Programm], cited in Hoffman, Protection for Computer Software: An Inter-
national Overview: Part 1, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 337, 339 (1988) [hereinafter 
Hoffman, International Overview] (German originality criteria); Judgment of March 7, 
1986, supra note 25 (French originality criteria); Judgment of April 11, 1984, Pret., Pisa, 
56 IL DIRITTO DI AUTORE [DIR. AUT.] 85 [hereinafter Pretore of Pisa], cited in Comment, 
Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 653 (Italian originality criteria). 
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intellectual creations.46 To qualify for copyright protection, pro-
grams must evidence "design superiority over the general average 
ability .... "47 The threshold level, however, of "design superi-
ority" may be rather high for certain programs.48 For example, 
some German courts have been reluctant to extend protection to 
computer programs for video games presumably because the cre-
ative effort required was considered too trivia1.49 French and 
Italian courts have established their own divergent originality 
criteria. The French "intellectual contribution" standard for pro-
tection by copyright requires programs to be creative in the sense 
that they are not mere rearrangements of another's steps or 
ideas.50 Italian courts, however, have required computer pro-
grams to be of sufficient creativity so as to constitute "work[s] 
pertaining to the sciences."51 In light of these diverging standards, 
there appears to be little concurrence with respect to originality 
criteria for copyright protection eligibility. 
2. Scope of Software Protections 
Similar differences exist with respect to the scope of copyright 
protections afforded by individual member states.52 Under tra-
ditional copyright law, right holders have certain exclusive rights 
regarding the reproduction, adaptation, and distribution of their 
works.53 Among these rights are the traditional "moral rights" 
which grant authors exclusive rights to claim authorship of their 
work and to restrict subsequent adaptation thereof.54 Such rights 
protect the integrity of an author's work by circumscribing activ-
46 Hoffman, International Overoiew, supra note 45, at 339. 
47 See Inkasso-Programm, supra note 45, at 287, quoted in Hoffman, International Over-
view, supra note 45, at 339. . 
48 See Green Paper, supra note 5, at 187; see also Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, 
supra note I, at 647-48. 
49 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note I, at 647-48. 
sOld. at 650; see also Hoffman, International Overoiew, supra note 45, at 440-42. Eligibility 
for copyright protection under French law is further complicated by the fact that the 
amendment extending copyright protection to software, adopted in 1985, does not ad-
dress the legal status of software authored before that date. Sumner, supra note 25, at 
347. 
51 Pretore of Pisa, supra note 45, at 85, quoted in Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, 
supra note I, at 653. 
52 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6. 
53 See Green Paper, supra note 5, at 189-93. See generally S. STEWART, supra note 2, at 
50-78. 
54 S. STEWART, supra note 2, at 59-62. 
1990] UNIFORM PROTECTIONS FOR SOFTWARE 489 
ities, such as distortion or adaptation, that might prove damaging 
to his or her reputation. 55 While German copyright law extends 
these traditional moral rights to creators of software, France and 
the United Kingdom deny authors these rights.56 British and 
French authors, therefore, have significantly less discretion over 
subsequent modification of their works. 57 Thus, the extent of 
copyright protection available to authors in each of these member 
states may vary considerably. 
3. Terms of Protection 
Finally, member state copyright protections may vary signifi-
cantly as to duration. 58 In France, copyright protection is limited 
to a term of twenty-five years from the creation of a work. 59 In 
Germany, however, protection extends for the life of the author 
plus seventy years.60 Under article 7(8) of the Berne Convention, 
French software is not entitled to a longer period of protection 
in other member states than that established under French law.61 
Hence, although marketed in jurisdictions with longer protection 
periods, French programs are nevertheless limited to twenty-five 
years of protection.62 French programs that are marketable after 
this relatively short term of protection has run are then vulner-
able to exploitation.63 
55Id. For a discussion of moral rights and an example of their application in another 
medium, see generally Comment, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive 
Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628 (1989). Film makers maintain that colorization threat-
ens the integrity of their films and prejudices their artistic reputations. Id. They argue 
that copyrights confer upon them the moral right to veto colorization of their works. Id. 
It is not clear, however, to what extent moral rights may be necessary with respect to the 
protection of computer programs. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
56 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 646-52. 
57Id. 
58 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6. 
59 Loi nO 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985, supra note 29. 
60 Urheberrechtsgesetz, § 64, 1965 BGBI.I 1282, trans. in COPYRIGHT LAWS & TREATIES, 
supra note 28, at Germany: Item 1-1 (Supp. 1984-86). Yet, noncopyright protections for 
some videogames have been limited to terms of six to twelve months. Comment, Software 
Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 648; see infra note 63. 
61 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 
1886, art. 7(8), _U.S.T. _, T.I.A.S. No. _, _U.N.T.S. _, reprinted in SEN. TREATY Doc. 
No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
62 See id. 
68 See id. These concerns over divergent terms of protection take on heightened signif-
icance with respect to German videogames which may be limited to twelve months of 
protection under German law. Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 
648. Under article 7(8) of the Berne Convention, these programs are soon vulnerable to 
490 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.2 
B. Issues Arising from Disharmony 
Uneven enforcement64 of disparate laws may significantly dis-
tort competition and restrain the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, and capital within the Community.65 Software developers 
are more likely to establish operations and market their products 
in member states affording more extensive legal protection.66 
Developers, for example, may be less inclined to produce and 
market in France with its narrow originality criteria, limited au-
thors' rights, and significantly shorter term of protection.67 Dif-
ferences in member state law thereby affect investment decisions 
and ultimately impede the free movement of capital throughout 
the Community.68 
In member states where legal protections are limited or non-
existent, software developers are particularly vulnerable to pi-
racy.69 A member state that is hostile to copyright monopolies-
and thus reluctant to vigorously enforce copyright protections-
may discourage firms located elsewhere in the Community from 
distributing their products inside its borders.70 Uneven enforce-
ment may thus result in significant distortions to internal trade. 
Producers, understandably reluctant to market their goods in 
unprotected jurisdictions, may respond with territoriallicensing71 
exploitation when marketed outside Germany regardless of protections accorded similar 
programs in those markets. See Berne Convention, supra note 61, at art. 7(8). 
64 While this Comment focuses on fundamental legal differences in member state pro-
tections for software, inadequate and inconsistent enforcement of existing law also con-
tributes significantly to widespread piracy and the market distortions it engenders. See 
Comment, Software Protection in the EEG, supra note I, at 657-59; see also infra notes 117, 
121. 
65 See generally Comment, Software Protection in the EEG, supra note I, at 657-69. 
66 See id. at 670; Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6, 8. 
67 See Comment, Software Protection in the EEG, supra note I, at 651. 
68 See id. at 657-69. 
69 [d. at 657-58. 
70 See id. at 657-69. 
71 [d. at 666. "Territorial licensing" involves licensing agreements by which developers 
keep their products out of certain undesirable markets, presumably to avoid increased 
risks of piracy. [d. Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) prohibits "all agreements 
between enterprises ... which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the Common Market." Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 3(a), 298 V.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Com-
ment, Software Protection in the EEG, supra note I, at 666. Article 85 would seem to prohibit 
such agreements, especially where discrimination against national markets is involved. 
Comment, Software Protection in the EEG, supra note I, at 666. It is unclear, however, as to 
whether territorial licensing is, in fact, expressly prohibited. For a thorough analysis of 
this issue, see id. at 662-69. 
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or outright refusal to sell software in these markets.72 Language 
differences among the member states require manufacturers to 
produce separate language versions of software packages for each 
country.73 In member states where manufacturers perceive a high 
risk of piracy, it may not prove worthwhile for them to produce 
a separate language version for that market.74 Threatened with 
unauthorized reproduction and predatory marketing, software 
producers may also seek artificially high prices in order to recoup 
a faster return on their investment. Consumers thereby suffer 
limited availability and higher prices. Moreover, with little incen-
tive to invest additional effort or resources, producers may be 
reluctant to update or service their software.75 
Divergent software protections impede the free movement of 
goods, services, persons, and capital by directly influencing in-
vestment and marketing decisions.76 Such distortions to a com-
petitive market may thereby contravene article 3 of the Treaty 
of Rome (EEC Treaty) which requires the elimination of obstacles 
to a competitive and open market.77 Moreover, an uncertain and 
capricious investment climate generally discourages development 
and marketing of software throughout the Community.78 
II. PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
A. Overoiew 
Article 3 of the EEC Treaty provides for the elimination of all 
customs duties, quotas, and other obstacles to a single market.79 
The elimination of such obstacles, however, is not in itself suffi-
cient to ensure a competitive internal market.80 Thus, the EEC 
Treaty contains several provisions requiring the harmonization 
of various member state laws.81 In its 1985 White Paper,82 the 
Commission acknowledged the need for harmonization of pro-
72 See Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 635, 658-59. 
7. Federation Against Software Theft (FAST), EC Green Paper on Copyright and the 
Challenge of Technology, 5 COMPUTER L. & PRAC. 94 (1989). 
HId. 
75 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 672. 
76 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6, 8. 
77 See EEC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. 3. 
78 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6. 
79 EEC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. 3(a). 
80 See White Paper, supra note 6, at 17. 
81/d. at 17-22; EEC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. lOOA. 
82 See White Paper, supra note 6. 
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tective measures for computer software and pledged to submit a 
proposal as a matter of priority.83 The Commission's 1988 Green 
Paper on copyright84 further emphasized the need for harmo-
nization and outlined a framework for such a proposa1.85 Con-
sequently, the Commission recently submitted to the Council a 
proposed directive establishing a Community framework for the 
legal protection of computer software.86 
The proposed directive introduces protections where they do 
not already exist and establishes a standard of uniform protec-
tion. The Commission thus hopes to eliminate restraints on the 
free circulation of computer programs within the EEC.87 More-
over, the Commission has expressed concern as to the competi-
tiveness of European firms in the world software market. 88 Cur-
rently, V.S. firms are the dominant suppliers of software in the 
Community.89 By creating a favorable environment for the in-
vestment of intellectual effort and financial resources, the Com-
mission hopes that European software firms may better compete 
with those of the V.S. and other industrialized nations.90 
8SId. at 37. 
84 See Green Paper, supra note 5. 
85 See id. at 170-201. 
86 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4. The Commission submitted its proposed direc-
tive to the Council on January 5, 1989. Id. at 4. Differences in the availability and scope 
of protections for software threaten the proper functioning of the internal market. Id. at 
8. The appropriate legal basis for such a directive is thus found within article 100A of 
the EEC Treaty providing for approximation of member state laws that may affect the 
functioning of the internal market. Id.; EEC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. 100A. According 
to article 100A, the proposed directive must be adopted by a qualified majority of the 
Council in cooperation with the European Parliament (Parliament) and after consultation 
with the Economic and Social Committee. EEC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. 100A. Having 
obtained a favorable opinion from Parliament, the Council has now instructed its Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (COREPER) to formulate a 
"common position." Press Release, Council of the European Communities, General Sec-
retariat (Brussels, July 18, 1989). There are pending, however, various proposals to amend 
the proposed directive. See, e.g., infra note 109. 
87 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 6. 
88 See Green Paper, supra note 5, at 171-75. The Commission is particularly concerned 
with small and medium sized enterprises which are expected to contribute significantly 
to the growth of the European software industry. Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 5-
6. 
89 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 174. The Commission estimates that in 1985, the U.S. 
share of the Western European software market comprised sixty-five to eighty-five percent 
of the market for system software and approximately fifty-five percent for application 
software. Id. at 172. 
90 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 5. 
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B. Protection by Copyright 
The Commission has selected copyright as the appropriate 
means to ensure adequate legal protection for software against 
unauthorized reproduction.9 ! Within this copyright framework, 
computer programs are to be protected as literary works.92 The 
proposed directive thus subjects computer programs to the same 
originality criteria that apply to literary works.93 The only re-
quirement then, for determining a program's eligibility for pro-
tection, is that the work is original.94 There are no other quali-
tative or aesthetic tests. 95 
Copyright, however, will only protect the expression of a com-
puter program.96 It will not protect the ideas, logic, or algorithms 
underlying the program.97 Copyright, therefore, protects the 
compilation of these underlying steps rather than protecting the 
91Id. at 7. The Commission's determination was based on the overwhelming weight of 
evidence submitted during the consultation process following publication of its Green 
Paper. Id. For a critical review of the proposed directive and its protection of computer 
programs by copyright, see Staines, The European Commission's Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 183 (1989). 
92 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 13. Article 1(2) states, in pertinent part, that 
"[p]rotection shall be accorded to computer programs as literary works." Id. The inter-
national copyright conventions to which EEC member states subscribe do not expressly 
extend copyright protections to software. Id. at 7-8. By treating computer programs as 
literary works, the proposed directive includes software within the parameters of these 
international conventions. Id. 
9' Id. at 13. Article 1(4)(a) states that "[a] computer program shall not be protected 
unless it satisfies the same conditions as regards its originality as apply to other literary 
works." Id. 
94Id. at 9. The BSA, however, argues that the originality criterion of article 1(4)(a) 
requires clarification. BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2. The Explanatory Memoran-
dum introducing the proposed directive (Explanatory Memorandum) defines originality 
to mean that "the work has not been copied." Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 13. 
Incorporating this definition into the text of article I (4)(a) would significantly clarify the 
issue of a program's originality. See BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2; see also COMMON 
STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 2:2. 
95 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 9. 
96 Id. at 13. Article 1(3) states, in pertinent part, that "[p]rotection in accordance with 
this Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program but shall 
not extend to the ideas, principles, logic, algorithms or programming languages under-
lying the program." Id. But see BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 1-2 (exclusion of 
"logic, algorithms, or programming languages" invites confusion, may cause excessive 
litigation, and departs from the treatment of computer programs as literary works); see 
also COMMON STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 2:1-2. 
97 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 13. Algorithms are the steps used to construct a 
program in the same fashion that a composer uses musical scales to create a score. Id. at 
5. 
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steps individually.98 Likewise, the proposed directive would not 
protect access-protocols and interfaces as copyrightable subject 
maUer.99 Effective monopolies of interfaces and access-protocols 
stifle technical progress by impeding the development of com-
patible programs. IOO Moreover, such monopolies hinder the de-
velopment of industry standards for compatibility and interoper-
ability. 101 In light of these goals, access-protocols and interfaces 
are not protected. 102 
C. Authorship and Beneficiaries 
The proposed directive confers exclusive rights upon the per-
son or group of persons who has created a computer program. 103 
This person or group of persons is defined as the right holder.l04 
Where the author of a program is working under contract or in 
the course of employment, the employer or party commissioning 
the work shall retain exclusive rights in the program. 105 All au-
thors of a work will qualify for protection if at least one of the 
authors is eligible under that member state's copyright law with 
respect to literary works. 106 
98 [d. 
99 [d. at 13. Article 1(3) states, in pertinent part, that "[w)here the specification of 
interfaces constitutes ideas and principles which underlie the program, those ideas and 
principles are not copyrightable subject matter." [d. Interfaces and access-protocols are 
those aspects of a computer program that ensure compatibility with other programs and 
interoperability of software and hardware. [d. at 7; see also Green Paper, supra note 5, at 
184. But see BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 1-2 (objecting to exclusion of interfaces 
as copyrightable subject matter). 
100 See Green Paper, supra note 5, at 184. 
101 See id. 
102 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 13. 
103 [d. at 14. Article 2(1) states, in pertinent part, that "the author of a computer program 
is the natural person or group of natural persons who has created the program." [d. 
104 See id. 
105 [d. Article 2(3) states that "[w)here a computer program is created under a contract, 
the natural or legal person who commissioned the program shall be entitled to exercise 
all rights in respect of the program, unless otherwise provided by contract." [d. Article 
2(4) states that "[w)here a computer program is created in the course of employment, the 
employer shall be entitled to exercise all rights in respect of the program, unless otherwise 
provided by contract." [d. 
106 [d. Article 3(1) states that "[p)rotection shall be granted to all natural or legal persons 
eligible under national copyright legislation as applied to literary works." [d. Article 3(2) 
states, in pertinent part, that "the computer program shall be protected in favour of all 
authors if at least one author is a beneficiary of protection in accordance with [article 
3(1))." [d. 
Under the proposed directive, authors presumably register their copyrights pursuant 
to the laws of their respective member states. See EEC Treaty, supra note 71, at art. 100A; 
1990] UNIFORM PROTECTIONS FOR SOFTWARE 495 
D. "Restricted Acts" 
The proposed directive articulates various "restricted acts," that 
is, certain uses of a computer program which require authoriza-
tion of the right holder.lo7 The proposed directive thus gives 
authors exclusive rights to control the reproduction, adaptation, 
and distribution of their works. lOB Under the proposed directive, 
right holders will also enjoy exclusive rights to control reproduc-
tion, especially with respect to the viewing, running, transmission, 
and storage of their works. 109 
An author's exclusive rights to control reproduction, adapta-
tion, and distribution are not exhausted by the rental, leasing, or 
Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 15; CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 8, at 108. Under 
article 3 of the Berne Convention, foreign authors need not register their copyrights 
within the EEC to enjoy protections under Community law. See Comment, Will the Soviet 
Union and the Peoples' Republic of China Follow the United States' Adherence to the Beme 
Convention?, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 207, 209-10 (1990) [hereinafter Comment, 
Berne Convention]; Berne Convention, supra note 61, at art. 3. Article 5 of the Berne 
Convention outlines the principle of national treatment under which authors marketing 
their works in a foreign country receive the same protections enjoyed by citizen-authors 
of that country. Comment, Berne Convention, supra, at 209-10; Berne Convention, supra 
note 61, at art. 5. Although the Berne Convention does not explicitly extend copyright 
protections to software, the proposed directive extends such protections by treating com-
puter programs as literary works. See supra note 92. Thus, under the Berne Convention's 
principle of national treatment, foreign authors will enjoy copyright protection when 
marketing their works within the EEC without regard to protections available in their 
country of origin. See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 8. 
[d. 
107 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 14. Article 4 states, in pertinent part: 
[T]he exclusive rights ... shall include the right to do or to authorize: (a) the 
reproduction of a computer program by any means and in any form, in part or 
in whole. In so far as they necessitate a reproduction of the program in part or 
in whole, loading, viewing, running, transmission or storage of the computer 
program shall be considered restricted acts; (b) the adaptation of a computer 
program; (c) the distribution of a computer program by means of sale, licensing, 
lease, rental and the importation for these purposes. 
108 See id. at 10-11. These provisions appear to include the traditional moral rights 
which enable authors to maintain the integrity of their works by restricting adaptation 
and publication. See id. But see infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
109 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 10-11. Strict control over reproduction and 
adaptation should protect authors from "reverse engineering." BUSINESS SOFTWARE As-
SOCIATION, WHITE PAPER: COPYING THROUGH REVERSE ENGINEERING 14 (Nov. 1989). 
Reverse engineering is the process by which a computer program is taken apart and then 
rebuilt in such a manner as to conceal its true origin. /d. at 1. But a proposal to amend 
the proposed directive would significantly undermine protections provided under the 
proposed directive by providing a right to reverse engineering. See id. at 14. Adoption of 
such a right would stifle investment and innovation in the European software industry 
and would imperil many small and financially vulnerable firms. [d. at 8-9, 14. See also 
Financial Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at 6, col. 4. 
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licensing of the program. lJO The author's exclusive rights, how-
ever, are exhausted once the program has been sold with his or 
her consent. III Once a program has been sold to the public, 
purchasers need not obtain authorization for the normal use, 
transmission, or storage of the program nor can they be restricted 
from lending it to third parties. I 12 Reproduction and adaptation, 
however, other than for the purposes of normal use, still require 
authorization of the right holder.113 The proposed directive fur-
ther prevents authors who have sold their programs from re-
stricting use of their works by public libraries.lJ4 
E. Term of Protection and Infringement 
The proposed directive establishes a term of protection of fifty 
years from the date of creation of a computer program. ll5 The 
110 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
1I1Id. at 14. Article 4(c) states, in pertinent part, that "[tJhe right to control the distri-
bution of a program shall be exhausted in respect of its sale and its importation following 
the first marketing of the program by the right holder or with his consent." Id. Article 
5( 1) states: 
Id. 
Where a computer program has been sold or made available to the public other 
than by a written license agreement signed by both parties, the acts enumerated 
in Article 4(a) and (b) shall not require the authorization of the right holder, in 
so far as they are necessary for the use of the program. Reproduction and 
adaptation of the program other than for the purposes of its use shall require 
the authorization of the right holder. 
112 See id. at 11. Article 5( 1), however, effectively invalidates "shrink-wrap" licensing 
agreements.Id. at 12. These agreements advise purchasers of their obligations and rights 
by way of written notice on the packaging of the software. Id. Unwrapping of the package 
by the purchaser manifests consent to the obligations so expressed. Id. Previously, authors 
were able to "sell" their programs under shrink-wrap agreements without forfeiting strict 
control over reproduction, adaptation, and distribution. See id. The BSA objects to the 
proposed directive's discriminatory treatment of software sold under shrink-wrap agree-
ments. BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2; see also COMMON STATEMENT, supra note 9, 
at 2:5. 
113 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 14. But see BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 
3 (recommending substantial clarification of the provisions of article 5(1)). 
114 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 14. Article 5(2) states: 
Where a computer program has been sold or made available to the public by 
means other than a written license agreement signed by both parties, the exclusive 
right of the right holder to authorize rental shall not be exercised to prevent use 
of the program by the public in non-profit making public libraries. 
Id. The BSA, however, argues that the use of software in public libraries poses serious 
risks of harm to the economic interests of authors. BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 
3. At the very least, the proposed directive should require stringent safeguards to minimize 
these risks. Id.; see also COMMON STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 2:6. 
115 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 14. Article 7 states that "[p Jrotection shall be 
granted for 50 years from the date of creation." Id. But see BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 
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proposed directive further creates a cause of action for the im-
portation and possession of unauthorized reproductions of pro-
grams where the party knew or should have known of the in-
fringement. lI6 All dealings in these infringing copies including 
the sale, receipt, transmittal, and storage thereof would provide 
a cause of action under member state law.lI7 In addition, the 
proposed directive establishes a claim against those who produce, 
import, possess, or deal in articles or software specifically de-
signed to circumvent technical protections for preventing repro-
duction. lIB The proposed directive, therefore, prohibits those 
programs developed to facilitate unauthorized reproduction of 
copy-protected software. lI9 
III. PROTECTIONS UNDER THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED 
DIRECTIVE 
A. Eliminating Market Distortions 
The Commission's proposed directive establishes a common 
framework for the legal protection of software within the EEC.120 
By clearly defining eligibility criteria and the scope and term of 
9, at 3 (recommendation to amend article 7 of the proposed directive to extend protection 
for the life of the author plus fifty years, consistent with the term of protection generally 
provided under the Berne Convention); see also COMMON STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 2:7. 
116 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 14. Article 6(1) states that "[i]t shall be an 
infringement of the author's exclusive rights in the computer program to import, possess 
or deal with an infringing copy of the program, knowing or having reason to believe it 
to be an infringing copy of the work." [d. 
117 [d. at 12. Under the Berne Convention's principle of national treatment, foreign 
authors marketing their works within the EEC normally have a cause of action in that 
member state in which the transgression occurred. See Berne Convention, supra note 61, 
at art. 5(3). This raises the issue of enforcement of rights granted under the proposed 
directive. See BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 3-4. The proposed directive is noticeably 
silent on the matter of enforcement. See id. The BSA recommends adding certain pro-
visions that would facilitate infringement actions. [d. Recommendations include shifting 
the burden of proof in such actions, liberalizing rules on evidence and inspections, and 
establishing stronger criminal and civil remedies and fines. [d.; see also COMMON STATE-
MENT, supra note 9, at 2:8-9. 
118 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 14. Article 6(2) states that "[i]t shall be an 
infringement of the author's exclusive rights in the computer program to make, import, 
possess or deal with articles intended specifically to facilitate the removal or circumvention 
of any technical means which may have been applied to protect a program." [d. 
119 [d. For a discussion on the subject of utilities for illegally reproducing copy-protected 
software and their legal treatment in France, see generally de Bellefonds, The Copying of 
Software and Software for Copying: Case Law in France: La Commande Electronique Case, 11 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 338 (1989). 
120 See supra notes 79-119 and accompanying text. 
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protection, the proposed directive should result in significant 
improvement to the functioning of the internal market. 121 For 
example, the proposed directive would eliminate divergent mem-
ber state originality criteria that establish minimums of intellec-
tual effort or scientific value. 122 Under the proposed directive, 
the only requirement for eligibility is that of originality-that a 
program is the author's own work and is not itself a copy.123 This 
clear standard should eliminate much of the confusion and dis-
tortions currently resulting from the divergent interpretations of 
member state courts. 124 
The proposed directive would also harmonize the scope and 
term of protections among member states. First, the Commis-
sion's proposed directive establishes a uniform term of protection 
of fifty years from the creation of a program. 125 Second, authors 
are granted uniform rights as to the reproduction, adaptation, 
and distribution of their works. 126 Harmonization, therefore, 
should eliminate the legal disparities whereby authors enjoy 
greater protections, for example, under German law than French 
law. 127 
In light of these improvements, legal protections accorded by 
individual member states should no longer factor into the invest-
ment decisions of software producers. Previously, software de-
velopers were more likely to establish operations in member states 
that afforded more extensive legal protections. Harmonization 
should effectively eliminate these distortions to competition and 
the free movement of capital within the EEC.128 
The proposed directive should also alleviate market conditions 
that have encouraged territorial licensing and market discrimi-
nation. Uniform protections would thus eliminate market distor-
121 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. Any success of the proposed directive 
in limiting piracy, protecting authors' rights, and eliminating market distortions, of course, 
presumes effective enforcement of the member state laws implemented under the pro· 
posed directive. See BSA, WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 3-4. Uniform law without 
adequate enforcement jeopardizes the reforms of the proposed directive. See id.; COMMON 
STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 2:8-9; supra note 125. See also Tamburrini, supra note 20, at 
82 (protections without appropriate criminal sanctions would likely prove ineffective). 
122 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 56-57, 59-63 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
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tions resulting from the reluctance among producers to market 
in jurisdictions with more limited protections. Uniformity, there-
fore, may significantly improve availability of software in member 
states such as Greece and Portugal where legal protections for 
software are limited. 129 
Uniform protections may also affect pricing policies to the 
benefit of consumers. Producers, operating in a less capricious 
legal environment, may be less inclined to seek artificially high 
prices for their products in order to recoup a faster return on 
their investments. Rather, a stable investment climate will enable 
producers to take a more long-term view with respect to pricing 
and returns on capital. 130 In fact, uniformity should foster an 
environment throughout the EEC that is generally more favor-
able to investment in software development. 131 
B. Balancing of Interests 
Throughout its proposed directive, the Commission makes a 
concerted effort to balance an author's exclusive proprietary 
rights, on the one hand, with the public's interest in technical 
progress, on the other. 132 Certainly a framework of copyright 
protection creates a favorable environment for the investment of 
intellectual and financial resources, thereby promoting develop-
ment and innovation. 133 But monopoly rights created under copy-
right may hinder technical progress by protecting innovations 
that might otherwise contribute to the development of new soft-
ware. 134 The Commission has thus been cautious in granting 
exclusive rights under copyright law. 135 For example, in the in-
terest of promoting technical innovation and greater standard-
ization within the computer industry, the Commission limits pro-
prietary rights to some aspects of software such as access-
protocols and interfaces. This gives other authors the flexibility 
to incorporate identical interfaces and access-protocols into their 
own programs, thereby ensuring greater compatibility and stan-
129 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
13! See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
132 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 16. 
133 [d. 
134 See Green Paper, supra note 5, at 184. 
135 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 7. 
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dardization. 136 Similarly, the Commission endorses the flexibility 
of protection by copyright, recognizing the advantage of a system 
that provides statutory protection of private intellectual property 
interests while at the same time permitting other authors to de-
velop analogous programs based on similar or even identical 
ideas. 137 
C. Rights of Authors 
The "restricted acts" specified in the Commission's proposed 
directive should afford authors considerable control over repro-
duction of their programs. 138 In light of the vulnerability of soft-
ware to unauthorized reproduction and considering that even a 
partial reproduction may result in significant economic harm to 
the author, such rights are necessary if the right holder is to 
achieve adequate protection for his or her work. 139 For technical 
reasons unique to computer programs, normal use requires tem-
porary reproduction as a part of the internal processes of the 
computer on which they are run.140 In addition, software man-
ufacturers frequently recommend the making of a back-up copy 
of a program. 141 Under the proposed directive, these activities, 
though typically inconsequential, constitute "restricted acts" over 
which the right holder retains considerable discretion. 142 Where 
producers perceive a risk of piracy or misappropriation due to 
such activities, they are free to restrict reproduction by means of 
licensing or lease agreements. 143 For example, the commercial 
rental of computer programs represents a serious threat to au-
thors' economic rights. 144 Because rental software is particularly 
susceptible to unauthorized reproduction, it is essential that pro-
ducers retain control over the rental of their programs. 145 
136 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. 
137 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 7. 
138 See supra notes 107-10, 113 and accompanying text. 
139 See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 11. 
140 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 190. Such internal processes include loading, running, 
transmission, and storage of the program. See Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 10. 
141 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 190. See generally de Bellefonds, supra note 119, at 338 
(brief discussion of back-up copies and their legal treatment in France). 
142 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
143 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
144Id. at 11. For an overview of commercial software rental and the corresponding risks 
of piracy, see generally Zigelbaum, The Computer Software Protection Act: A Legislative 
Response to Software Piracy through Software Rentals, 1 SOFTWARE L.J. 67 (1985). 
145 Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 11. 
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The right holder's control over reproduction, however, is sig-
nificantly diminished once the program has been sold on the 
market with his or her consent. 146 In such cases, producers waive 
their strict rights and purchasers no longer require authorization 
for the types of insubstantial reproduction mentioned above. 147 
Similarly, producers waive their rights to control adaptation upon 
sale of their programs. 148 Such waiver of control is especially 
appropriate in that computer programs frequently require alter-
ations for purposes of tailoring the software to its intended use 
or eliminating the "bugs" frequently found within new pro-
grams. 149 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's proposed directive establishes uniform legal 
protections for computer software within the Community. Such 
harmonization of member state law would eliminate differences 
in the availability, scope, and terms of protection for software 
that currently impair the free movement of goods and capital 
within the EEC. A common framework for the protection of 
computer programs should thereby eliminate distortions in the 
investment decisions of software developers with respect to estab-
lishment, product line, and pricing. Moreover, uniformity should 
eliminate disincentives to the marketing of software in certain 
jurisdictions. Harmonization, therefore, should result in an en-
vironment significantly more favorable to the investment of in-
tellectual and financial resources in EEC software development. 
Mark P. Tellini 
146 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text; Proposed Directive, supra note 4, at 
10-11. 
148 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
149 Comment, Software Protection in the EEC, supra note 1, at 660. 
